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*"In the existing League of Nations, world-governing with its superpowers, this Republic will have no part. There can be no misinterpretation, and there will be no betrayal of the deliberate expression of the American people in the recent election, and, settled in our decision for ourselves, it is only fair to say to the world in general, and to our associates in war in particular, that the League covenant can have no sanction by us."*

*"The aim to associate nations to prevent war, preserve peace, and promote civilization our people most cordially applauded. WE YEARNED FOR THIS NEW INSTRUMENT OF JUSTICE, but we can have no part in a committal to an agency of force in unknown contingencies; we can recognize no superauthority."*

Thus the President of the United States specifically vindicates the position taken by the ADVOCATE OF PEACE since we entered the war. No League to Enforce Peace is or can be in harmony with American institutions. The attempt in Paris to establish such a league, giving to it the duty and power of enforcing the terms of the war treaty of Versailles, has, so far as the United States is concerned, come to its appropriate end. The United States refuses to accept Mr. Wilson's League as "the enforcing agencies of the victors of the war." Mr. Harding speaks the language of the American Peace Society when he says, "International association for permanent peace must be conceived solely as an instrumentality of justice, unassociated with the passions of yesterday, and not so constituted as to attempt the dual functions of a political instrument of the conquerors and of an agency of peace. There can be no prosperity for the fundamental purposes sought to be achieved by any such association, so long as it is an organ of any particular treaty or committed to the achievement of the special aims of any nation or group of nations." Ever since the publication of William Ladd's essay, in 1840, there has been a growing belief in America—indeed, elsewhere in the world—that there must be international conferences in the interest of international law, and an international judiciary for the interpretation of that law. There lies the way of international peace. That has been the position of the American Peace Society for nearly a century. Naturally followers of our work will be encouraged, immeasurably heartened, to find America with a President standing unequivocally for "an association of nations, based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and co-operation for the prevention of war," an association "conceived in peace and dedicated to peace." "In the national referendum to which I have adverted we pledge our efforts toward such association, and the pledge will be faithfully kept." Thus the supergoverning League of Nations is rejected and America's conception of an international co-operation defined.

Another evidence of the President's right thinking is his recommendation in behalf of an early establishment of peace with the Central Powers of Europe. He recommends a declaratory resolution by Congress, with necessary "qualifications essential to protect all our rights," declaring the state of peace which all America craves. We cannot ignore the Treaty of Versailles, for under it various nations have assumed various obligations. The President is quite right, therefore, in proposing that we ratify such portions of the existing treaty which cover our rights and interests. The ADVOCATE OF PEACE has consistently assumed, since the signing of the Treaty, that the United States should ratify it with reservations and modifications, excluding the covenant and protecting our essential interests. The American Government is at last pledged to that course, and we are on the way "to turn disappointment and delay into gratifying accomplishment." The establishment of peace between the United States and the Central Powers of Europe is to be accomplished without violating the rights or sensibilities of the nations with whom we were associated in the war. Thus, "the continuing life of nations and the development of civilization" may be pursued again with unity of effort, and this will be done by proving "anew our own capacity for co-operation in the co-ordination of powers contemplated in the Constitution."

Surely now America may present a united front, as she goes forth "to the realization of our aspirations for nations associated for world helpfulness without world government, for world stability on which humanity's hopes are founded."

## DEVELOPING OUR FOREIGN POLICY

THERE are three facts which Secretary Hughes is responsible for, which facts seem to indicate something of the direction which our foreign policy for the immediate future is to take.

The first fact is that the present administration does not look with favor upon war between American republics. Our protest to Costa Rica and Panama evidently ended an incipient war in Central America; but it also served notice that the present administration will view with disfavor any similar attempt to settle international disputes in this hemisphere.

The second fact is that the present administration has a definite conception of certain American obligations in Europe. We of America have not forgotten the purposes that led us into the World War. Germany was responsible for that war and Germany is morally bound to make reparation so far as may be possible. The American people believed that in April, 1917. They

believed it throughout the war. The present government of the United States has reaffirmed that faith and purpose of the American people. We believed then, we believe now, in the establishment of a sound basis on which can be built a firm and just peace under which the various nations of Europe can achieve once more economic independence and stability. In his memorandum to Dr. Walter Simons, German Foreign Minister, under date of April 4, Secretary Hughes uses precisely this language. Evidently the present administration feels no enmity for Germany. In the same note Mr. Hughes says: "This government believes that it recognizes in the memorandum of Dr. Simons a sincere desire on the part of the German Government to reopen negotiations with the Allies on a new basis, and hopes that such negotiations, once resumed, may lead to a prompt settlement, which will at the same time satisfy the just claims of the Allies and permit Germany hopefully to renew its productive activities."

The third fact is that the present administration evidently has more respect for the Hague conferences and the Permanent Court of Arbitration existing at The Hague than did the Wilson administration. This is evident from the fact that, under date of April 1, Secretary Hughes suggested to the Norwegian Government that Norway's claims against the United States for ships requisitioned during the war be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. It appears that this note was sent to the Norwegian Minister, Mr. Bryn, now in Washington. Chairman Benson, of the Shipping Board, is authority for the explanation that the Shipping Board had made an allowance of \$14,157,000 for a number of contracts for ships under construction in this country for Norwegians before the war. These ships were taken over by this government, however, during the war and completed. Norway expresses dissatisfaction with the amount, contending that allowance should be made for the speculative value of the contracts, due to the increased price of tonnage during the war. The Shipping Board refused to accept this argument and referred the question to the State Department for adjustment. Minister Bryn made representation to Secretary Hughes, in reply to which Mr. Hughes offered the suggestion that the matter be referred to The Hague Court. Thus we are encouraged to believe that the new administration not only remembers the work done at The Hague, but sympathizes with it and looks to it as a practical method of settling international disputes.

We may reasonably expect that the future of American foreign policy will evolve out of a past that is known and tried. The day of wildcatting in international relations is, we fondly believe, about to end.

## ORGANIZING FOR PEACE

IT OUGHT not to be necessary in these days to quote the remark of Isocrates that "Civilization is a bond transcending nationality." Success in the development of individual States depends upon the development also of a world cosmopolitanism.

While men generally will agree to this truth, there are two tendencies which obstruct its realization. One of these is the disposition to demand too much. Nearly a thousand years ago there was an attempt to stop feudal wars by a league to enforce peace, but the plan was objected to by Bishop Gerard of Cambrai as provocative more of universal perjury than universal peace, which proved to be the case. Alexander I of Russia urged the adoption of a league to enforce peace; indeed, he succeeded in embodying such a project in a secret article of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed by Great Britain and Russia, April 11, 1805. But while the project became the basis of the Holy Alliance ten years later, it was as a matter of fact too ambitious to be applied. The failure of Versailles resulted because of the attempt to accomplish the impossible. As W. Allison Phillips wrote in the *Edinburgh Review*, under date of April, 1917: "The only conceivable basis of an international juridical system is the *status quo* as defined in treaties; therefore a new league to enforce peace would, like the old Holy Alliance, be committed to stereotyped political systems, which though reasonably satisfactory at the outset, might not remain so." It is now clear to all that the attempt to end the war and to set up an international organization for peace at one and the same time was more ambitious than wise. We now know that Mr. Lansing favored the adoption by the Conference in Paris of a resolution embodying a series of declarations as to the creation, the nature, and the purposes of a League of Nations, which declarations could be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, accompanied by an article providing for the negotiation of a detailed plan, or else by an article providing for the summoning of a world congress in which all nations, neutrals as well as belligerents, would be represented and have a voice in the drafting of a convention establishing a League of Nations in accordance with the general principles declared in the preliminary treaty. He believed in the need for a speedy restoration of a state of peace. He favored, therefore, the postponement of the determination of the details of the organization of the League of Nations until the proposed League should be thoroughly considered. The attempt at one and the same time to end the war and to set up an international organization for peace was a mistake. It was a mistake primarily because the treaty of peace was a war measure, drafted by a war psychology. The establishment of an organization for